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.JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, Section 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues for Review: 
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO VACATE WAS UNTIMELY? 
A. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING IMPLICITLY THAT UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 (b)(6) DID NOT RENDER 
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO RELIEF? 
1. WAS DEFENDANT SERIOUSLY DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL? 
2. WAS DEFENDANT DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL? 
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT DID 
NOT ACT DILIGENTLY? 
Standard of Review 
There is no dispute on the facts of this case because only Defendant presented 
evidence to the trial court for the purposes of Defendant's Motion to Vacate, which 
evidence was in the form of various Affidavits; Plaintiffs counsel submitted to evidence 
whatsoever. Also, although not required, as to Issue Numbers I. A. 1., III., and IV above, 
Plaintiffs counsel did not even oppose (arguments or law) Defendant's counsel's 
presentation thereof in relation to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. AH of these issues were 
presented to the trial court as part of Defendant's Motion to Vacate and as such were 
1 
preserved for this appeal. Therefore, this Court of Appeals is reviewing solely issues of 
law to determine if the trial court incorrectly applied the undisputed facts to the applicable 
laws and rules. The Standard of Review for all issues on this appeal is therefore one of 
correctness of error because only questions of law are here for review. Lincoln Benefit 
Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern Properties (1992) 838 P. 2d 672, 674; 
Hartford Leasing Corporation v. State (1994) 888 P.2d 694, 697. No particular 
deference is given to the trial court under the correctness standard. Lincoln Benefit Life 
Insurance Company, supra at 674. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
CASES 
Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P. 2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d 357 
Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development (1980) 611 P. 2d 369, 371 
Stewart v. Sullivan (1973) 506 P. 2d 74, 76; 29 Utah 2d 156 
Workman v. Nagle Const.. Inc. (1990) 802 P. 2d 749, 751 
RULES 
Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 (b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-51-36 
2 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
United States Constitution. Amendment V 
United States Constitution. Amendment XIV, Section 1 
Utah State Constitution. Article L Section 7 
NATURE OF THE CASE. PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
Over ten (10) years ago in December 1988, Defendant's name was forged on an 
Equipment Lease for an unrelated restaurant unbenownst to Defendant. Then, in 
February 1997, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant claiming money due 
under such Equipment Lease. Defendant's counsel filed an Answer upon service of the 
Complaint. After subsequent counsel of Defendant withdrew, Plaintiffs counsel almost 
immediately filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve 
on Defendant proper notice of the Notice to Appoint Counsel, Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on April 14, 1998, and the Amended 
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed on May 7, 1998 (hereinafter "Motion to 
Vacate"). The trial court had, based on such Orders, granted a money judgment in favor 
of Plaintiff in the principal sum of $21,915.54 exclusive of court costs, interest, and 
attorney's fees. 
Defendant's first notice of the judgment entered against him was upon receipt of 
a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings August 28, 1998, after which time 
Defendant promptly retained current counsel. Shortly after Defendant's current counsel 
investigated the facts, reviewed the evidence, and researched law relevant to these events, 
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and on November 17, 1998, Defendant's current counsel filed on Defendant's behalf a 
Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside the Orders for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate by final Order entered on 
January 22, 1999. A final [Amended] Order was entered on February 1, 1999, denying 
the Motion to Vacate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 28, 1988, more than eight (8) years before Plaintiff/Appellee 
Federal Financial Company (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed the instant lawsuit, the signature 
of Defendant/Appellant, Manuel T. Armenta (hereinafter "Defendant") was wrongfully 
forged on an alleged Equipment Lease and Guaranty document (hereinafter collectively 
"Equipment Lease"). [R. 177-179, 247 ff 4, 5, 248 1 5] Defendant was unaware of 
the forgery until the instant lawsuit was filed. [R. 231 f 21, 232 f 21, 248 1 5] The 
Equipment Lease was for a restaurant known as Guadalahara Grill 175 West 200 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant never had any connection with such restaurant in terms 
of ownership, operation, or otherwise. [R. 247 f 3, 231 f 21, 232 f 21] 
On February 6, 1997, more than eight (8) years after the forgery. Plaintiff filed 
the instant action against Defendant claiming money due under the Equipment Lease. 
Plaintiffs counsel knew at all times of Defendant's home and work addresses 
at which process and notices could be served on Defendant. For example, Plaintiffs 
counsel caused Defendant to be served with process in this action by personal service at 
Defendant's home located at 1116 W. 285 S., Orem, Utah (hereinafter "Defendant's 
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Home Address"). [R. 227 f 5, 32-35] Also, after Defendant's first attorney, Silvia Pena 
Chacon, withdrew as counsel, Plaintiffs counsel served a Notice to Appoint Counsel on 
Defendant at Defendant's work address of Defendant's restaurant, Mi Ranchito, located 
at 2747 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter "Defendant's Business 
Address"). [R. 228 f 8, 145-146] 
Defendant took prompt actions to defend himself each time he was served with 
proper notice of proceedings in this lawsuit. First, Defendant hired Attorney Chacon 
to file an Answer to the Complaint alleging, inter alia, the meritorious defenses that the 
signature on the Equipment Lease purporting to be that of Defendant was actually a 
forgery (fraud), and that the statute of limitations (6 year statute) had run on Plaintiffs 
claims. [R. 227 f 5, 130-131] Then, after Attorney Chacon withdrew as Defendant's 
counsel, Defendant hired Steven Russell. [R. 228 f f 7, 9] 
Then, on January 12, 1998, Attorney Russell filed a withdrawal of counsel, leaving 
Defendant without benefit of retained counsel. Also, Attorney Russell never served 
Defendant with notice of such withdrawal at either Defendant's Home Address or 
Defendant's Business Address, even though Attorney Russell knew of such addresses the 
same as did Plaintiffs counsel. Such addresses were a matter of record with the court. 
[R. 166-167] 
Meanwhile, knowing that Defendant was then without counsel and before 
Defendant even knew that Attorney Russell had withdrawn as Defendant's counsel, 
Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve on Defendant a Notice to Appoint Counsel at either of 
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Defendant's known addresses. Plaintiffs counsel filed such Notice with the court on 
January 20, 1998. [R. 145-146, 229 f 12] In addition, Plaintiffs counsel quickly 
proceeded to file a Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant on January 29, 
1998, only nine (9) days after Plaintiffs counsel filed (not served) a Notice to Appoint 
Counsel with the trial court. [R. 229 f 13, 82-86] Plaintiffs counsel easily obtained an 
order for summary judgment [R. 172-173, 96-97, 102-104] since Defendant was never 
served with notice of such motion. 
Also, Plaintiffs counsel failed to serve Notice of Entry of Judgment on Defendant 
at Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's Business Address [R. 98-99, 170-171], 
despite knowing that both were accurate addresses at which to properly apprise Defendant 
of proceedings in this lawsuit. 
Then, Plaintiffs counsel waited until the three (3) months' period for filing a 
motion to vacate under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1) had expired before 
making attempts to collect on the judgment obtained against Defendant. Obviously, 
Defendant had no opportunity to take actions to vacate the judgment because Defendant 
had never been served with notice of such judgment during such three (3) month period, 
and had no benefit of retained counsel. 
On August 28, 1998, almost five (5) months after entry of the Order Granting 
Summary Judgment filed April 14, 1998 and almost four (4) months after entry of the 
Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment filed May 7, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel 
commenced collection on the Judgment. On such date, Plaintiffs counsel further 
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demonstrated his full knowledge of where to provide proper notice to Defendant by 
causing Defendant to be served by personal service at Defendant's Home Address with 
a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings. [R. 230 f 16, 174-176] 
Upon receiving such notice of the Supplemental Proceedings at Defendant's Home 
Address, Defendant acted promptly to protect his interests. Within three (3) weeks after 
becoming aware of such Judgment, Defendant diligently hired current counsel to protect 
his interests, culminating in the filing of the Motion to Vacate. Such Motion was denied 
by the trial court and is now the subject of the instant appeal. [R. 230 f 18, 231 f 19] 
Defendant has been the victim of fraudulent conduct stemming back more than ten 
(10) years unbenownst to him until recently and has been subjected to a serious lack of 
due process in the manner in which Plaintiffs counsel has sought to prosecute this lawsuit 
against Defendant. Defendant now asks this Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's 
ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate the judgment and amended judgment 
entered against Defendant [R. 301-306] because such relief is the only way to avoid a 
substantial miscarriage of justice to an innocent and diligent party, Defendant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiffs counsel violated the mandatory provisions of three (3) significant Utah 
laws and rules as follows: (1) Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which 
provides that the prevailing party "shall" promptly give notice of the entry of judgment 
to all parties; (2) Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides 
that Plaintiffs counsel "must" serve a Notice to Appoint Counsel on Defendant before 
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initiating further proceedings and "no further proceedings shall be held in the matter 
until 20 days elapsed from the filing date of such Notice"; and (3) Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-51-36 which provides that Plaintiffs counsel was "required" to 
serve on Defendant written Notice to Appoint Counsel before any further proceedings 
were had against Defendant. As a direct result of such violations by Plaintiffs counsel, 
Defendant was prevented from learning of the Motion for Summary Judgment and Orders 
entered thereon. 
The aforementioned violations by Plaintiffs counsel deprived Defendant of his due 
process rights encompassed in the above-cited law and rules as further protected by the 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, as applied to Utah State via 
United States Constitution, Amendment V, and Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 
7. As a direct result of such violations by Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant did not receive 
actual notice of such actions taken against Defendant until August 1998, until more than 
three (3) months after entry of judgment which prevented filing a motion to vacate under 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1). Where Defendant thereupon acted 
promptly and diligently to hire current counsel to file the subject Motion to Vacate, the 
trial court erred in ruling that Defendant did not file such Motion to Vacate timely within 
the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6). 
As a separate and independent argument, Defendant contends that the conduct and 
omissions of his prior counsel were so grossly negligent as to render Defendant without 
effective assistance of counsel-i.e., no counsel at all. Such conduct and omissions are not 
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"simple" negligence attributable to Defendant and does not thereby cause Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate to be classified under "excusable neglect" as set forth in Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(1) which only permits such a motion to vacate within three 
(3) months after entry of judgment. Rather, such conduct and omissions by Defendant's 
prior counsel demonstrated such extreme incompetency that Defendant was rendered 
unable to know of the critical actions being taken by Plaintiffs counsel against Defendant 
and to thereby defend against same. As such, Defendant is entitled to set aside the 
judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6). 
ARGUMENTS 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE WAS TIMELY. 
The issue presented here is whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate was untimely and not meritorious as set forth in the court's 
Order. [R. 301-306] Such issue revolves around two (2) primary questions, namely: (1) 
Whether Defendant's circumstances fall within the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6) which permits a Motion to Vacate to be filed more than three 
(3) months after entry of a judgment; and (2) Whether Defendant's circumstances fall 
under the category of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1) of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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A. UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 60 (b)(6) RENDERS 
DEFENDANT ENTITLED TO RELIEF. 
Defendant has been seriously deprived of due process and effective 
assistance of counsel which resulted in judgment being entered against Defendant. The 
trial court erred in denying Defendant his "day in court" pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6) [formerly Rule 60 (b)(7)]. 
1. DEFENDANT WAS SERIOUSLY DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
BY PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL. 
Lack of due process has been long determined by the Utah Supreme 
Court to be a reason justifying relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Bish's Sheet Metal Company v. Luras (1961) 359 P. 2d 21, 22, 11 Utah 2d 
357; Interstate Excavating v. AGLA Development (1980) 611 P. 2d 369, 371. Plaintiffs 
counsel took advantage of Defendant at the time when Defendant's counsel withdrew as 
such. In order to obtain summary judgment against Defendant, Plaintiffs counsel 
violated specific and critical Utah laws put in place for the very purpose of ensuring 
substantial due process would be afforded to parties under both the Utah State 
Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and the United States Constitution, Amendment V, as 
applied to Utah State via United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1. 
For example, Defendant's counsel provided the trial court with copies 
of the certificates of service demonstrating that Plaintiffs counsel knew from the 
inception of this lawsuit forward exactly where to serve notices of proceedings properly 
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on Defendant, namely, at Defendant's Home Address and Defendant's Business Address. 
[R. 227 f 5, 32-35] Also, the certificate of service regarding the Motion and Order in 
Supplemental Proceedings served on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address long after 
the judgment had been entered demonstrates the full knowledge of Plaintiffs counsel of 
Defendant's whereabouts at all times. [230 f 18, 231 1 19] These facts were not 
disputed by Plaintiffs counsel in his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
Rule 58A (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides clear that 
the prevailing party "shall" promptly give notice of the entry of judgment to all parties. 
Yet, Plaintiffs counsel chose not to provide proper notice of such judgment to Defendant, 
despite this critical law and the clear knowledge of Defendant's specific addresses by 
Plaintiffs counsel. The notice of entry of judgment allegedly served by Plaintiffs 
counsel was sent to an address which was never Defendant's address. Again, Plaintiffs 
counsel offered no dispute in evidence, argument, or law on this issue. 
Workman v. Nagle Const., Inc. (1990) 802 P.2d 749, 751, states: 
. . .if a losing party has remained ignorant of a 
judgment in part because the prevailing party 
has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the 
resulting delay is more reasonable for purposes 
of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7). . . .while compliance with 
those rules [Rule 58A(d) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Rule 4-504 Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration] does not bring about 
the automatic invalidity of an entered judgment, 
it is a weighty factor in determining the 
timeliness of later challenges to the judgment 
under Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7). 
[emphasis added] 
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Based upon the foregoing undisputed facts that Defendant's ignorance of the judgment 
was primarily as a result of Plaintiffs counsel's violation of the foregoing Rules, then 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate should be deemed timely pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6). The trial court seriously erred as a matter 
of law in ruling otherwise. 
Also, Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company v. D.T. Southern 
Properties (1992) 838 P.2d 672, 675, dealt with defendants claiming that their ability to 
timely challenge the default judgment was impaired because Plaintiffs counsel failed to 
comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 58A(d) and Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-504. However, in that case, the court found that the defendants 
had later received actual notice of the judgment when they were served with a 
supplemental proceedings order only seven (7) weeks after the default judgment had been 
entered. The court cited Workman, supra, and reviewed the case in terms of using such 
failure to comply with the Rules noted above as an important factor in resolving the 
timeliness issue. The court then determined that since the defendants had actual notice 
of the judgment within the three (3) months period for "excusable neglect" under Rule 
60(b)(1) and did not file their motion to vacate during such period, defendants had not 
acted timely. 
In total contrast to the facts of Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance 
Company, supra, Defendant in the instant case did not receive any such actual notice of 
the judgment until August 28, 1998, when he was served with a Supplemental 
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Proceedings Order. But receiving such notice on such date was long past the three (3) 
months' period after entry of judgment in this case. [R. 172-173, 96-97, 102-104] 
Therefore, Defendant had no opportunity whatsoever to take actions to vacate the 
judgment within the three month time period of Rule 60(b)(1). Thus, the trial court 
erred in ruling that Defendant did not act timely when in fact Defendant was deprived of 
the chance to move to vacate the judgment within such three month time period as a 
direct result of Plaintiffs counsel violation of the foregoing Rules for notice to be given 
to Defendant. As such, under Workman, supra, Defendant is entitled to prevail on this 
appeal. 
It is critical for this Court to realize that Plaintiffs counsel served 
proper notices on Defendant in this action at Defendant's Home Address and Defendant's 
Business Address only when doing so would profit Plaintiff, such as in serving process 
at the beginning of the lawsuit and then in serving papers regarding collecting on the 
judgment wrongfully obtained more than one (1) year later. However, Plaintiffs counsel 
knowingly prevented Defendant from learning about the judgment entered against him by 
not serving notice to Defendant at either Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's 
Business Address of the Notice to Appoint Counsel [R. 168-169, 80-81], Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 82-86], or the notice of entry of judgment [R. 170-
171, 98-99]. Thus, Defendant suffered a serious lack of due process as a result of the 
deliberate or at least grossly negligent conduct of Plaintiff s counsel which violated well-
established Utah law. Under such circumstances, the trial court erred in denying 
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Defendant's Motion to Vacate because Defendant is clearly entitled to at least have his 
"day in court." In addition, unless Defendant's Motion to Vacate is granted, Plaintiff via 
the wrongful conduct of Plaintiff s counsel will have been aided in perpetrating a fraud 
upon Defendant. 
In addition, Rule 4-506 (3) of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration required Plaintiffs counsel herein to serve a Notice to Appoint Counsel 
before initiating further proceedings and then not until 20 days elapsed from the filing 
date of such Notice. Plaintiffs counsel never served a copy of such Notice on Defendant 
at Defendant's Home Address or Defendant's Business Address. [R. 168-169, 80-81] By 
failing to give such notice, Plaintiffs counsel violated such Rule by initiating the "further 
proceedings" of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment which resulted in judgment 
against Defendant. 
And, even had proper notice been given under Rule 4-506(3), which 
it was not, Plaintiffs Motion was filed (on January 29, 1998) only nine (9) days after 
filing the Notice which further violated the Rule. [R. 82-86] Such violations by 
Plaintiffs counsel further demonstrates that Defendant suffered a substantial lack of due 
process. Plaintiffs counsel also failed to even address this issue regarding violations 
of Rule 4-506(3) by Plaintiffs counsel in opposing Defendant's Motion to Vacate, 
wherein Plaintiffs counsel did not offer any contrary evidence, arguments, or law; 
therefore, the facts and law on this issue are undisputed in favor of Defendant. The 
default judgment entered from such Motion was improper. It would be extremely unjust 
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to allow Plaintiffs counsel to violate the timing requirements of Utah law which helped 
Plaintiff gain an advantage over Defendant who was not represented by counsel and then 
not allow Defendant the opportunity to vacate such wrongfully obtained judgment based 
on "timeliness" grounds. Thus, the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Vacate. Defendant should be allowed a fair opportunity to defend the case on the merits. 
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs counsel violated a companion 
Utah statute, namely, Utah Code Annotated Section 78-51-36 which mandates as follows: 
When an attorney dies or is removed or 
suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to 
an action or proceeding for whom he was acting 
as attorney must, before any further 
proceedings are had against him be required 
by the adverse party, by written notice, to 
appoint another attorney or to appear in 
person, [emphasis added] 
This statute clearly confirms the legislative intent behind Rule 58A(d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-506(3) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which 
is to ensure that parties not represented by counsel, such as Defendant in the instant case, 
receive the protection of due process requirements before the opposing party initiates 
further proceedings in the case. Where Plaintiffs counsel failed to comply with such 
mandatory law by filing the Motion for Summary Judgment almost immediately after 
attorney Russell's withdrawal notice was filed and without serving a Notice to Appoint 
Counsel on Defendant at either of his two (2) well-known addresses, Defendant was 
/ / / 
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deprived of a fair and adequate opportunity to move to vacate the subject judgment in this 
case. As such, Defendant's Motion to Vacate was timely. 
In addition, even though it is reasonable to infer from the evidence 
presented by Defendant's counsel to the trial court that Plaintiffs counsel knew exactly 
where to serve proper notices on Defendant in this action all along, it is important to 
point out that injustice to Defendant would still be the result if Plaintiffs counsel's 
violations were made inadvertently, as oppposed to knowingly because Plaintiffs counsel 
was held to specific statutory duties under Utah law. Where Defendant lost out on a 
vital opportunity to defend himself on the merits resulting from Plaintiffs counsel's either 
intentional or unintentional conduct, Defendant should be permitted to vacate the 
judgment according to the law cited above and the liberal policy of the law as described 
below. 
Further, Plaintiffs counsel is estopped to argue that Defendant was 
not diligent (which is not true), when in fact Plaintiffs counsel himself violated several 
specific, mandatory Utah laws and rules which prevented Defendant from discovering the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the judgments obtained thereon by Plaintiffs counsel, 
all at the most vulnerable time for Defendant, namely, right after Defendant's prior 
counsel withdrew. Plaintiffs counsel was subject to specific statutory duties with which 
he failed to comply. According to Workman, supra, and other authorities cited above, 
Plaintiffs counsel created the dilemma for Defendant and is therefore estopped from 
arguing against reversing the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Also, 
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since Plaintiffs counsel has failed to provide any opposition (evidence or authorities) 
whatsoever to justify Plaintiffs counsel's failure to comply with his statutory duties, 
Plaintiffs counsel, and accordingly Plaintiff, must be held accountable for such wrongful 
conduct. Thus, this Court must reverse the trial court for erring in not granting 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
2. DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL. 
Plaintiffs counsel mischaracterizes the incompetent conduct of 
Defendant's prior counsel as "negligence," when in fact such conduct was clearly 
"incompetency of counsel." Plaintiffs counsel is incorrect in claiming that the 
incompetency of counsel of Mr. Russell amounts only to "simple negligence" which 
should be imputed to Defendant under basic agency principles alluded to in the case cited 
by Plaintiffs counsel of Russell v. Martell (1984) 681 P.2d 1193, 1195. Rather, 
incompetency of counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel illustrated by the fact 
scenario of the instant lawsuit consists of conduct and omissions by counsel which are 
so lacking in competency as to amount to no assistance of counsel at all. Defendant's 
moving papers never used the terms "negligence," "inadvertent conduct," or 
"misconduct" to describe such actions despite the attempts by Plaintiffs counsel to distort 
the content of Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Rather, Defendant's prior counsel, Steven 
Russell, unsuccessfully opposed Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery in a seriously 
incompetent manner by creating an obviously defective affidavit by Sergio Armenta. Mr. 
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Russell also incompetently requested Sergio Armenta to sign in the name of Defendant 
(based on a power of attorney document unrelated to this lawsuit) alleged responses to 
Plaintiffs First sets of discovery requests. [R. 235-236] However, as a result, Plaintiffs 
counsel served a Second set of discovery requests which Mr. Russell never sent to 
Defendant. [R. 228 f 10, 229 ff 10-11] It was this Second set of requests upon which 
Plaintiffs counsel based its Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant which was 
granted. As a direct result of Mr. Russell's severe incompetence, Defendant never got 
a fair opportunity to oppose Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, to respond to Plaintiffs first 
and second sets of discovery, and to oppose Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Motion which, 
when granted, placed Defendant in his current dilemma. 
In a worst case scenario, Mr. Russell should have at least sent 
Defendant a copy of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and discovery requests at either of 
Defendant's known addresses (no evidence suggests Mr. Russell even tried such method). 
Both addresses were clearly a matter of record in the court's file. Then, if he had no 
contact from Defendant, Mr. Russell could have filed a motion to withdraw as counsel 
and give proper notice to Defendant thereof so that Defendant could have the opportunity 
to defend against Plaintiffs claims on the merits. But, in addition to the misconduct of 
Plaintiffs counsel, and largely because of Mr. Russell's incompetence, Defendant never 
got that chance. Therefore, Mr. Russell's incompetence renders Defendant entitled to 
relief from the judgments entered against him pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah 
/ / / 
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Rules of Civil Procedure and Stewart v. Sullivan (1973) 506 P.2d 74, 76, 29 Utah 2d 
156, cited in Defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
The interpretation by Plaintiffs counsel of Stewart in his opposition 
to the Motion to Vacate has missed the crux of its holding. Stewart granted relief under 
Rule 60 (b)(7) [now Rule 60 (b)(6)! on the grounds that the plaintiffs attorney had failed 
to inform plaintiff about the dismissal of plaintiff s case and about subsequent motions, 
which Court stated in plain words as follows: 
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the dismissal and 
subsequent motions made in respect thereto. It was not 
until several months after his counsel became 
incapacitated to represent him and the plaintiff had 
employed other counsel he learned what had 
transpired. Id. at 76. 
These were the circumstances which warranted the Court in permitting the plaintiff to 
seek relief pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(7) [now Rule 60 (b)(6)] where plaintiff did not bring 
a motion for such relief until more than one (1) year after the dismissal was entered. 
Had such plaintiffs counsel not acted so extremely incompetent, the plaintiff would have 
been able to file said motion much earlier. Plaintiffs reason justifying having the 
dismissal be "without prejudice" (i.e., that plaintiffs discovery responses to one 
defendant responded to questions which were similar to those by a second defendant) was 
only relevant to the issue of defending the previous motion on the merits, not to the Rule 
60 (b)(6) issue. As such, Stewart does support Defendant's position herein that 
/ / / 
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Defendant is entitled to relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) based on "incompetency of 
counsel "/"ineffective assistance of counsel". 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sullivan, supra, does not 
unequivocally stand for the proposition that incompetency of counsel is a reason justifying 
relief under Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court is respectfully 
requested to consider the specific facts of the instant case which will reveal on their own 
that they demonstrate that, at least in the instant case, incompetency of counsel exists and 
justifies relief to Defendant under Rule 60 (b)(6) which prescribes "any other reason 
justifying relief. . . . " 
In addition, such serious incompetency of counsel by Mr. Russell can 
in no way negate the detrimental effect of Plaintiff s counsel violating Utah statutes and 
rules which directly prevented Defendant from having a fair and adequate opportunity to 
defend himself on the merits in this action. As such, the trial court decision must be 
reversed in favor of Defendant. 
3. CONCLUSION: DEFENDANT WAS TIMELY IN FILING THE 
MOTION TO VACATE MORE THAN THREE (3) MONTHS 
AFTER ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. 
In review, and first, Defendant's signature was forged on the 
Equipment Lease ten (10) years ago, unbenownst to Defendant. Secondly, Plaintiffs 
counsel files the instant action against Defendant long after the expiration of the statute 
of limitations for Plaintiffs claims. Then, Plaintiffs counsel files a Motion for Summary 
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Judgment against Defendant almost immediately after Defendant's counsel withdrew and 
before Defendant even knew of such withdrawal and with no proper notice of the Motion 
or judgment given to Defendant. Then, Plaintiffs counsel waits until the three (3) 
months period for Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(1) expires before making 
efforts to collect on the judgment which requires actual notice to Defendant. Then, 
Defendant promptly hires new counsel to file the Motion to Vacate. Under such 
circumstances, due process and substantial justice can only be afforded to Defendant by 
reversing the trial court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate. The trial court 
simply failed to properly apply the undisputed facts to the applicable law, namely, Rule 
60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In light of the serious lack of due process by Plaintiffs counsel and 
ineffective assistance of counsel by Attorney Russell to which Defendant was subjected, 
Defendant's circumstances clearly justify the granting of Defendant's Motion to Vacate 
under the provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 (b)(6). 
II. DEFENDANT ACTED DILIGENTLY. 
Every time proper notice was given to Defendant in this action, Defendant took 
diligent actions to defend himself and protect his rights. For example, when the 
summons and complaint was served on Defendant at Defendant's Home Address, 
Defendant hired attorney Silvia Chacon to file an Answer asserting meritorious defenses. 
[R. 227 f 5, 130-131, 36-37] Also, when Ms. Chacon sent notice to Defendant of her 
withdrawal as counsel, followed up by a Notice to Appoint Counsel by Plaintiffs 
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attorney, both notices of which were sent to Defendant's Business Address, Defendant 
promptly hired another attorney, Mr. Steven Russell, to defend his interests. [R. 228 ff 
7, 9] Then, when Defendant was served with the Plaintiffs Motion for Supplemental 
Proceedings on August 28, 1998, Defendant took prompt action to hire current counsel, 
to assist such counsel in investigating the events which transpired in this action without 
notice to Defendant, and caused the instant Motion to be filed. [R 230 f 18, 239 1f 19] 
Also, concurrently with filing the Motion to Vacate, Defendant provided Plaintiffs 
counsel with full responses to all sets of discovery requests including the subject Request 
for Admissions. [R. 232 f 22, 180-220] Therefore, it was Plaintiffs counsel's failure 
to provide adequate and fair notice of critical proceedings herein to Defendant, not any 
lack of diligence on Defendant's part, which prevented Defendant from being able to file 
the instant Motion sooner to defend against Plaintiffs claims on the merits. As such, the 
trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
In the opposition paper filed by Plaintiffs counsel to Defendant's Motion to 
Vacate, Plaintiffs counsel wrongfully attempted to create facts which do not exist in 
efforts to support his conclusory claim that Defendant was not diligent. For example, 
nowhere in Defendant's Motion to Vacate [R. 118-128, 226-233] did Defendant state, let 
alone "admit," to having not communicated regularly with his attorney. To the contrary, 
Defendant did communicate with attorney Chacon and via his son, Sergio Armenta, did 
communicate with attorney Russell. The fact that Mr. Russell failed to notify Defendant 
at all regarding Defendant's need to take further actions to defend himself goes to Mr. 
22 
Russell's serious incompetency as counsel, not to any lack of diligence on Defendant's 
part. Such incompetency of counsel was so serious and blatant that it cannot be 
attributable to Defendant in terms of rendering Defendant not entitled to relief herein. 
Also, Plaintiffs counsel contended in bad faith and falsely that Defendant failed to 
maintain the correct address for this Court when in fact, as set forth at length in 
Defendant's moving papers, Defendant's Home Address and Business Address were at 
all times in the Court's file. Such addresses of Defendant in fact were utilized by 
Plaintiffs counsel only at times which were convenient to Plaintiffs counsel, such as 
when he sought to serve Defendant in this action and when he sought to collect on the 
wrongfully obtained judgment against Defendant. As such, Defendant's Motion should 
be granted. 
In addition, Plaintiffs counsel acted totally out of line and without providing any 
evidentiary support whatsoever for his wild claims that Defendant engaged in fraud. 
Also, Plaintiffs counsel tried to confuse the court by making Defendant's son, Javier, 
who forged Defendant's signature on the Equipment Lease, to be the same as a different 
son, Sergio, who was in good faith assisting Defendant in retaining new counsel to defend 
against Plaintiffs claims in this lawsuit. [R. 228 f 9, 235-236] 
The trial court may only draw "reasonable" inferences from the facts and those 
"facts" can only be gleaned from the evidence properly before the court. Based on the 
trial court's findings of fact stated in its Order denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate, 
it is obvious that the trial court accepted as the "gospel truth" the conclusory statements 
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made by Plaintiffs counsel in his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. However, 
none of such wrongful statements can be supported by any evidence before the court for 
such Motion. Plaintiffs counsel failed to file any affidavits or other forms of 
evidence to support his opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate. Therefore, based 
solely on the evidence before the trial court which consisted of certain affidavits filed by 
Defendant in support of such Motion, the trial court could never draw any reasonable 
inferences from such evidence of any wrongdoing or lack of diligence by Defendant or 
even his son Sergio. What obviously occurred is that Plaintiffs counsel was successful 
in his bad faith efforts to steer the trial court's attention off track to an unsupported set 
of accusatory and conclusory statements. The trial court thus erred seriously to 
Defendant's detriment, rendering it necessary to reverse such decision forthwith. 
It is critical to point out here that when reviewing whether or not Defendant acted 
diligently, the only relevant period of time to review is the short window of time between 
when Defendant's attorney withdrew as counsel and the time which is three (3) months 
after the court entered judgment against Defendant. In essence, Plaintiffs counsel filed 
the Motion for Summary Judgment almost immediately after Defendant's attorney, Mr. 
Russell, withdrew as his counsel and before Defendant ever became aware of such 
withdrawal. Defendant clearly had no opportunity to take actions to defend himself under 
these circumstances. Defendant's fate was decided during a very short period of time 
when Defendant as a "lay person" was most vulnerable. Also, because of the wrongful 
conduct of Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant did not receive actual notice of the judgment 
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until August 28, 1998, when Plaintiffs counsel caused him to be served with the 
Supplemental Proceedings Order. Within three (3) weeks thereafter, Defendant had hired 
current counsel to take actions to vacate such judgment and spoke to other counsel prior 
to that time which helped Defendant locate current counsel. Such conduct demonstrates 
that Defendant acted diligently in pursuing the vacating of the judgments herein. 
Also, it is important to focus on the fact that it is Plaintiffs burden of moving the 
case along where Defendant only filed an Answer to the Complaint and no Counterclaim. 
As such, where Defendant is simply a "lay person", unlike an experienced litigation 
attorney who is continuously aware of pending deadlines and affirmative actions to be 
taken, Defendant acted reasonable in assuming that whenever Plaintiffs counsel took his 
next move to proceed with the action, then Defendant would receive proper notice thereof 
so that Defendant would know to take actions to defend himself. However, as a direct 
result of Plaintiffs counsel proceeded immediately to file a Motion for Summary 
Judgment in violation of well-established Utah law and rules, and to fail to give 
Defendant proper notices, Defendant was unable to protect his interests. Nonetheless, 
when Defendant was apprised of the Supplemental Proceedings Order, Defendant 
responded promptly herein. As such, Defendant acted diligently in this matter. The trial 
court's decision must be reversed. 
The trial court's Order to the effect that Defendant bears the sole responsibility for 
knowing about all proceedings pending in the lawsuit is a far reaching overstatement of 
basic duties of a defendant in any civil litigation. [R. 301-303] What the trial court has 
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done is to ignore all of the wrongful conduct of Plaintiffs counsel, intentional or 
unintentional (either one of which seriously deprived Defendant of due process), and to 
instead deem Defendant 100 % responsible to suffer all consequences of default 
judgments rendered against him. In addition, the court has overlooked the fact that 
Defendant is a "lay person" who was not represented by counsel at the time that 
Plaintiffs counsel sought to take such critical actions to obtain the wrongful judgment 
against Defendant. Such a statement in the trial court's Order is entirely contrary to the 
specific legislative mandate encompassed in Rule 60 (b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the liberality of Utah public policy in avoiding forfeiture of the opportunity 
for Defendant to have a trial on the merits. As such, the trial court's decision must be 
reversed. 
Defendant is entitled to an opportunity to defend itself on the merits of the instant 
action. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly supported this proposition as follows: 
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without serious 
injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally indulgent toward 
the setting aside of default judgments where there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and where timely application is made 
to set it aside. Consistent with the objective just stated, where there is doubt 
about whether a default should be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so, to the end that each party may have an opportunity to 
present his side of the controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance 
with law and justice, [emphasis added] Interstate Excavating, supra at 371. 
Defendant has demonstrated many reasonable justifications exist for vacating the default 
judgment and that Defendant acted timely and diligently in filing this Motion. All 
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reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the undisputed facts of the instant case 
should be viewed in a light favorable to allowing Defendant a fair opportunity to have a 
trial on the merits. Therefore, this Court should grant Defendant that opportunity. 
III. PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY REVERSING THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION. 
Plaintiffs counsel had a serious set of duties to comply with under Utah law and 
rules cited above which provide further guarantees to Defendant's constitutional rights to 
due process under the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and the United States 
Constitution, Amendment V, as applied to Utah State via United States Constitution, 
Amendment XIV, Section 1. The facts are undisputed which demonstrate that Plaintiffs 
counsel clearly violated such law and rules. The direct effect of such violations by 
Plaintiffs counsel is that Defendant was not served with proper notice of the Notice to 
Appoint Counsel, the Motion for Summary Judgment, and the resulting orders for 
summary judgment thereon in time for Defendant to have a fair and adequate opportunity 
to move to vacate such judgment within the three (3) month window permitted under Rule 
60 (b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Under RusselL supra at 1195, the wrongful conduct by Plaintiffs counsel is 
attributable to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff, as a result of the wrongful conduct and 
omissions by Plaintiffs counsel, must suffer the consequences of causing such a serious 
deprivation of the constitutional and statutory rights of Defendant to have proper notice 
of such critical proceedings in this lawsuit. Defendant should not suffer any such 
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consequences. As such, since Plaintiffs counsel created Defendant's plight. Plaintiff 
would in no manner whatsoever be prejudiced by this Court reversing the trial court's 
decision denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate, 
IV. DEFENDANT PRESENTED MERITORIOUS DEFENSES. 
This issue must be resolved in favor of Defendant since Plaintiffs counsel did not 
argue or otherwise dispute the meritorious defenses presented by Defendant in his 
Motion to Vacate. Also, even though the trial court's Order stated that Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate was not meritorious which is the subject of this appeal, the trial court's 
Order did not say that Defendant's "meritorious defenses" were not meritorious. [R. 301-
306] It is therefore undisputed that Defendant has presented meritorious defenses. Also, 
the defenses presented by Defendant as such, namely, statute of limitations and fraud 
(forgery), stand by themselves as sufficient, each one alone, to entirely render Defendant 
entitled to prevail on the merits against Plaintiff. [R. 130-131] As such, Defendant has 
demonstrated that there are substantial reasons making it wholly worthwhile in reversing 
the trial court's decision and in thereby permitting Defendant to have a trial on the 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing discussion, and after reviewing the issues on this appeal 
under the rule of correctness, it is clear that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's 
Motion to Vacate. Defendant was deprived of the statutory and constitutional protections 
customarily afforded and Defendant acted diligently in pursuing the vacating of the 
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subject judgment. Defendant would have acted sooner but for the serious violations of 
Utah law and rules by Plaintiffs counsel which prevented Defendant from learning of the 
judgment. Thus, this Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's ruling which 
denied Defendant's Motion to Vacate and thereby permit Defendant to have a fair and 
adequate opportunity to defend this case on the merits. 
Dated: May 10, 1999 LAW OFFICES OF MONTIVEL A. BURKE, II 
BY: 
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Moptivel A. Burke, II 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Manuel T. Armenta 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - BY MAIL 
I hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document described as BRIEF BY APPELLANT by mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following, on the date of May 10 , 1999. 
Bryan W. Cannon, Esq. 
Aspen Plaza 
871 E. 9400 S. 
Sandy, UT 84094 
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Bryan W.Cannon, #0561 
John R. Riley, #2758 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Aspen Plaza 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801)255-7475 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
MI RANCHITA d/b/a GUADALAHARA ; 
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as ] 
guarantor, ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 ORDER 
1 Civil No. 970900898 
1 JUDGE HENRIOD 
The Motion by Defendant Manuel T. Armenta for Order Vacating and Setting Aside 
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment came 
before the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, UCJA. The court, having received the memoranda of 
the parties, and the Affidavit of Manuel T. Armenta, and having reviewed the pleadings on file, 
now enters the following ruling, findings and order on said Motion: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
I. The court finds that the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact 
CK 
with his attorney who was representing him through the Motion for Summary 
Judgment in this case. 
2. The court finds that the facts advanced by the Defendant in support of his Motion 
to Set Aside are matters that were within the control of the Defendant for which 
the Defendant bears the sole responsibility in terms of his lack of knowledge of 
what was going on in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The Defendants' Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside Order Granting 
Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment are 
denied. 
DATED this % day of January, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
Steven L. Henriod, District Court Judg< 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, Bryan W. Cannon, will 
submit the above and foregoing Order to the court for signature, upon the expiration of five (5) 
days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days from mailing, unless written objection is 
filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504, UCJA. I certify that I served a copy of this 
proposed order and Notice on Montivel A. Burke II, Attorney for Defendant Manuel T. Armenta, 
360 West 550 South, Orem, Utah 84058, this / ^ c l a y of January, 1999, postage prepaid via 
first class mail. >^ 
DATED this I ^ day of January, 1999. 
&U^__ 
Bryan W.Cannon,#0561 
John R. Riley, #2758 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Aspen Plaza 
871 East 9400 South 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
Telephone: (801)255-7475 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
FEDERAL FINANCIAL COMPANY, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
MI RANCHITA d/b/a GUADALAHARA j 
GRILL and MANUEL T. ARMENTA as ] 
guarantor, ] 
Defendants. ] 
! ORDER 
1 Civil No. 970900898 
1 JUDGE HENRIOD 
The Motion by Defendant Manuel T. Armenta for Order Vacating and Setting Aside 
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment came 
before the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, UCJA. The court, having received the memoranda of 
the parties, and the Affidavit of Manuel T. Armenta, and having reviewed the pleadings on file, 
now enters the following ruling, findings and order on said Motion: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the Defendant's Motion was filed out of the time period in 
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which the Motion had to be filed and the Motion is not meritorious. 
2. The Court finds Defendants' Motion to set aside is untimely. 
3. The court finds that the Defendant is responsible for failing to remain in contact 
with his attorney who was representing him through the Motion for Summary 
Judgment in this case. 
4. The court finds that most of the reasons advanced by the Defendant in support of 
his Motion to Set Aside are matters that were within the control of the Defendant 
for which the Defendant bears the sole responsibility in terms of his lack of 
knowledge of what was going on in this case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. The Defendants' Motion for Order Vacating and Setting Aside Order Granting 
Summary Judgment and Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment are 
denied. 
DATED this / day of JanoaTy, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE 
Please take notice that the undersigned, attorney for Plaintiff, Bryan W. Cannon, will 
submit the above and foregoing amended proposed Order to the court for signature, upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days from mailing, unless 
written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504, UCJA. I certify that I served 
a copy of this amended proposed order and Notice on Monti vel A. Burke II, Attorney fo* 
Defendant Manuel T. Armenta, 360 West 550 South, Orem, Utah 84058, this ^ ~~~day of 
January, 1999, postage prepaid via first class mail. 
DATED t h i s P ^ 3 day of January, 1999. 
uW; 
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BISH'S SHEET METAL COMPANY v. LURAS Utah 2 1 
L'il.Nis.r.!) V'2<) 21 
court on an appeal without due notice of 
such appeal or the proceeding in the dis-
trict court to the party prevailing in the 
city court such a showing would t*tahh*di 
a lack of due process of law and the ag-
grieved party would he entitled to relief 
from the judgment of the district court 
even after the expiration of three months 
because relief from a judgment on account 
Rub>_ 
Civil Procedure, rule ( M M <7). 
11 risihiM :\Tu 
BISH'S SHEET METAL COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation. Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Chris J. LURAS. d/b/a Liberty Bell Bakery 
Company. Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 9309. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Civil action. From a judgment of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Ray Van Cott, Jr., J., the defendant ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., 
held that where notice of appeal was filed 
a f u r the entry of judgment, the fact that 
service was made he fore such entry did 
not affect the jurisdiction of the district 
court on appeal from the city court to try 
the case. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error 
C=>338(l). 370, 395, 428(1), 430(1) 
Under the rules, an appeal must be 
taken within one month after notice of 
entry of judgment, and appellant must 
serve and file a notice of appeal upon the 
adverse party, and such filing and the pay-
ment of fees therefor within the time 
allowed are the only requirements neces-
sary tor the court to have jurisdiction, but 
any failure to follow the rules makes the 
appellant subject to appropriate action by 
the court including dismissal of the appeal. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 73(h, I). 
2. Courts C=>I90(4) 
Where notice of appeal was filed after 
the entry of judgment, the fact that service 
was made before such entry did not affect 
the jurisdiction of the district court on 
appeal from the city court to try. the case 
but merely subjected the respondent to a 
dismissal of the appeal or other action in 
*he discretion of the court. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 73ih, / ) . 
3. Constitutional Law <£=>3I6 
Judgment C=>386(l) 
If a showing were made that district 
court reversed the decision of the city 
II. G. Metos, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant. 
Thomas A. DufTin, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
W A D E , Chief Justice. 
Bish's Sheet Metal Company as plain-
tiff commenced this suit in the city court 
wherein the court granted a judgment of 
"No Cause of Action" in favor of the de-
fendant, Chris J. Luras, who is the appel-
lant herein. This judgment was entered 
on February 4, 1960. On February 3, a 
notice of appeal was mailed to appellant's 
attorney. The notice of appeal was filed 
on February 26, 1960. On retrial of the 
case in the district court judgment was 
given in favor of Bish's Sheet Metal Com-
pany, who is the respondent herein. 
The sole ground of appeal to this court 
is that the district court lacked jurisdic-
tion to try the case because the appeal was 
taken prematurely. 
Rule 73(h) , U.R.C.P. relating to appeals 
from a city court to the district court pro-
vides that: 
"An appeal may be taken to the dis-
trict court from a final judgment ren-
dered in a city or justice court w ithin 
one month after notice of the entry of 
such judgment, or within such shorter 
time as may be provided by law. The 
party appealing shall within the time 
allowed, serve upon the adverse party 
a notice of appeal and file the same. 
Rule 73( / ) , U.R.C.P. provides that: 
C 
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"Failure of the appellant to take any 
of the sfurthcr steps to secure the re-
MCW of the case, except filing notice 
of appeal and dt positing the fees 
thcreior. shall not aftect the \ahdity 
of the appeal but is ground for such 
action as the district court dtcms ap-
propriate, which maj include dismissal 
of the appeal. * * * " l.Emphasis 
ours.) 
[ 1 , 2 ] It is apparent that Rule 73(h) , 
U.R.C.P. pro\ides that an appeal must be 
taken within one month after notice of 
entry of judgment and the appellant must 
se ive and file a notice of appeal upon the 
adverse part}. It is equally clear by the 
pro\isions of Rule 73{l), U R C.P. that the 
filing of the notice of the appeal and the 
pa>mcnt of the fees therefor within the 
time allowed are the only requirements 
necessary for the court to have jurisdic-
tion. All other steps, therefore, cannot 
affect the jurisdiction but any failure to 
follow the dictates of the rules makes the 
appellant subject to appropriate action by 
the court which may even include dismiss-
al of the appeal. Since the notice of ap-
peal was filed after the entry of the judg-
ment the fact that the s e n ice was made 
before such entry did not affect the juris-
diction of the court to try the case. It 
I. Rule 00(b). U.RC.P. "Menkes; In-
advertence; Excusable Neglect: Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On 
motion and upon such terms ns are just, 
the court nin.v in the furtherance of jus-
tice relieve n party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inndtrrteuce. surprise, or 
excusable neglect: (2) nevvlj discovered 
evidence which b.v due diligmic could not 
have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 50(h); (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated in-
trinsic or extrinsic). niiMeprescntation, 
or other misconduct of an ndvetse pnrtv; 
(4) when, for anj cause, the summons in 
nn action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant ns required by Uule 
4(c) and the defendant his failed to ap-
pear in said nction: (To the judgment 
is void, (G) the judgment has bioii satis-
fied, releitM'd, or disih.irgtd or o prior 
mere!) could have subjected respondent to 
a dismissal of the appeal or other action in 
the discretion of the court. 
[3 ] Defendant does not claim relief 
from this judgment ^r ^ r l n* nn t i^_©T 
knowledge of such appeal or the proceed-
i n g thereunder in the district court The 
record indicates that he had notice of 
such appeal and presented his defense 
and was accorded due process of law in 
that respect. If a showing were made 
that, regardless of the safeguards against 
such an occurrence the district court 
reversed the decision of the city court 
on an appeal without due notice or knowl-
edge of such appeal or the proceedings 
in the district court to the party who 
prevailed in the city court, such a showing 
would establish a lack of due process of 
law. The aggrieved party under such a 
showing would be entitled to relief from 
the jiicfgmcnt of "the district court under 
subdivision ('/) oi RmCWJb) Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure even after trTe~~ex pi ra-
tion ot three months becau^rTehrf^fforh a 
judgment on account of a lack of due 
process of l a w i s not expressly provided for 
by such rule.1 
Affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
HENRIOD, MCDONOUGH, CALLIS-
T E R and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is 
no longer equitable that the judgment 
should hove prospective application; or 
(7) atut other reason justifymo tchef 
ftom the opctatwn of the judgment. 
The motion *hall be made within a 
leasonabtc time and for reason* (J)% 
(2), (J), or (4), not mote than S months 
after the judgment, oidcrt or proceed-
ing uas entned ot taken A motion un-
der this subdivision (b) docs not affect 
the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of n court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve o party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to fcet 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from n indgnient shall be by mo-
tion as prescribed in these rules or hy 
nn independect action." (Emphasis 
outs ) 
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the trial court found that there was no basis 
to allow the defendant credit toward the 
joint venture of the No. 15848 sums paid as 
salary to his wife and son by the Ernest 
Wilson Company, Inc.; and made a finding 
as to the amount contributed to the joint 
venture by Ernest I. Wilson. 
The defendant contends that if there 
were a joint venture it was between the 
plaintiff and Archdome, Inc., a corporation. 
The defendant however contends that he 
should be entitled to the full proceeds of the 
sale of the home and land and that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to any of the 
proceeds, even though his financial contri-
bution to the project is without any sub-
stantial dispute. 
[4] It would be unconscionable for the 
plaintiff Score to lose his entire contribu-
tion while the defendant retained the entire 
proceeds of the home sale. 
This Court in the case of Bassett v. Bak-
er, Utah, 530 P.2d 1 (1974), defined a joint 
venture: 
A joint venture is an agreement between 
two or more persons ordinarily but not 
necessarily limited to a single transaction 
for the purpose of making a profit. The 
requirements and relationship are not ex-
actly defined, but certain elements are 
essential. The parties must combine 
their property, money, effects, skill, labor 
and knowledge. As a general rule, there 
must be a community of interest in the 
performance of the common purpose, a 
joint proprietary interest in the subject 
matter, a mutual right to control, a right 
to share in the profits and unless there is 
an agreement to the contrary, a duty to 
share in any losses which may have been 
sustained. 
[5] The existence of the joint venture 
must depend upon the facts of each case 
and formality of agreement is less impor-
tant than the acts and conduct of the par-
ties, and the facts that exist in each partic-
ular case. Holtz v. United Plumbing and 
Heating Co., 49 Cai.2d 501, 319 P.2d 617 
(1957). 
[6] Inasmuch as the findings and judg-
ment are supported by substantial credible 
evidence, under the standard rule of review 
they are entitled to the presumptions of 
verity. See Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 
2d 389,360 P.2d 176(1961). 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff (respon-
dent). 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL, J., concurs in result. 
WILKINS, J., having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
| KEYNUMBtR$YSU»0 SYSUM} ftlifr/f 
\jyJ 
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., S ^ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORA-
TION, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 16599. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, ,1980. 
Defendant appealed from an order of. 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, \ 
Jay E. Banks, J., which denied its motion to j 
set aside a default judgment rendered / 
against it for labor and materials furnished / 
in construction of water and sewer system. / 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held I 
that where defendant did not receive notice \ 
of trial date from its attorney after attor- / 
ney's withdrawal from case and where, I 
upon receipt of notice of default judgment, \ 
defendant immediately contacted its J 
present counsel who thereafter proceeded / 
with diligence to attack default judgment, I 
interests of justice would be best served by ) 
setting aside the default judgment. ( 
Judgment vacated; case remanded. 
d 
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Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which Wilkins, J., joined. 
1. Judgment <s»92 
In appropriate circumstances, default 
judgments are justified, and when so justi-
fied, they are invulnerable to attack. 
2. Judgment e=>92 
Default judgments are not favored in 
the law, especially where a party had timely 
responded with challenging pleadings. 
3. Judgment $=»135 
Policy of the law is to accord litigants 
the opportunity for a hearing on the merits 
where that can be done without serious 
injustice to other party; thus, courts are 
generally indulgent toward setting aside of 
default judgments where there is reasona-
ble justification or excuse for defendant's 
failure to appear and where timely applica-
tion is made to set it aside. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 60(b). 
4. Judgment e=»135 
Where there is doubt about whether a 
default judgment should be set aside, jloubi 
should be resolved in favor of doing so. 
Rules of Civil ProcedureTKuTe 60(b). 
5. Judgment e=* 143(11), 153(1) 
^ Where defendant did not receive notice 
of trial date from its ftttojrn^y^ftgr_attor-
ney*s withdrawal from case and where, 
upon receipt of notice of default judgment, 
defendant immediately contacted its 
present counsel who thereafter proceeded 
with diligence to attack default judgment, 
interests of justice would be best served by 
silting aside the~Hefault judgment. Eules 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(5)7" 
Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
E. H, Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
1. The rule provides that: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party from a final judg-
ment for the following reasons: (1) 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Agla Development Corpora-
tion seeks reversal of the denial of its mo-
tion based on Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.,1 to set 
aside a default judgment for $46,101.70 for 
labor and materials furnished in construc-
tion of water and sewer systems in two 
subdivisions being developed by the defend-
ant in Salt Lake County. 
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 
16, 1978. Defendant responded with an an-
swer asserting defenses and a counterclaim. 
A pre-trial conference was held on April 16, 
1979, at which defendant's counsel Robert 
J. Haws requested that he be allowed to 
withdraw, which request the court granted. 
The court instructed plaintiff's attorney to 
notify the defendant to obtain new counsel, 
and that the case was set for trial on May 7, 
1979. Plaintiff's attorney certifies that on 
April 16, such a notice was mailed to the 
defendant addressed to its business office. 
The record also contains a ce^ rtincaJtiojQ_J)y 
defendant's then counsel, Mr. Haws, thaJLhe 
mailed to the defendant a notice of the trial 
setting and of his withdrawal as counsel. 
As opposed to the foregoing stands the de-1 
fendant's denial that it ever received such 
notices. * 
On the day set for trial, May 7, no one 
appeared on defendant's behalf; and upon 
the basis~of evidence presented, judgment 
was entered for the plaintiff and defend-
ant's counterclaim was dismissed. 
In support of its motion to set aside the 
default judgment, defendant avers that its 
former counsel, Mr. Haws, withdrew from a 
number of cases simultaneously; and that 
the notice to appoint counsel may have been 
misplaced with numerous papers served 
upon the defendant's office by mail. And 
further, that it had no notice of the trial 
until it received the notice of the judgment 
daTeaMay 14, whereupon it immediately 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect . The motion shall be made 
not more than three months after 
the judgment . . . was entered 
INTERSTATE EXCAVATE 
Cllf as, Uul 
ppp Lar t.pd p n ^ n t counsel, who proceeded 
with djljpnpcp to prepare the motion (he 
avers it was prepared within four days) and 
f j H the pmtinn M f t l ^ J ^ J i l l <%* H.£l5J 
receiving the notice of judgment!. 
[1,2] It is not to be questioned that in 
appropriate circumstances default judg-
ments are justified; and when they are, 
they are invulnerable to attack. However, 
tliey are not favored in the law, especially 
where a party has timely responded with 
challenging pleadings. When that has been 
done some caution should be observed to see 
that the party is not taken advantage of. 
Speaking generally about such problems, it 
is to be kept in mind that access to the 
courts for the protection of rights and the 
settlement of disputes is one of the most 
important factors in the maintenance of a 
peaceable and well-ordered society.2 This 
of course must be done in obedience to 
rules; and it is to be conceded that there is 
a possibility that the defendant was less 
than diligent in attending to its interest in 
this lawsuit. But no evidence was taken, 
nor did the court make any findings other 
than the order denying defendant's motion. 
This is admittedly a perplexing case. 
From the standpoint of the plaintiff and its 
counsel, they appear to have proceeded 
without any impropriety, including appear-
ing on the trial date and presenting their 
case. Defendant counters with the aver-
ments that it received no such notice. Sup-
portive of the defendant's position, are the 
facts that the justification for its default 
rests upon the assertion of service of notice 
by ordinary mail; and that immediately 
upon learning of the judgment, it proceeded 
diligently with efforts to set it aside and 
contest the issues on the merits. 
[3,4] The uniformally acknowledged 
policy of the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, 
where that can be done without serious 
2. Sec. 11, Art. I. Utah Constitution. 
3. Locke v Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 
1111 (1955). 
G v. AGLA DEVELOPMENT Utah 3 7 1 
• II P.2d369 
injustice to the other party.3 To that end, 
the courts are generally indulgent toward 
the setting aside of default judgments 
where there is a reasonable justification or 
excuse^for the delendanls I allure to ap-
pear, ^mj where timely application is made 
to set it aside.4 Consistent with the objec-
tive just stated, where there is doubt about 
whether a default should be set aside, thel 
doubt should be resolved in favor of doing' 
so, to the end that each party may have an 
opportunity to present his side of the con-
troversy and that there be a resolution in 
accordance with law and justice.* 
[5] Application of the principles dis-
cussed herein to the instant situation leads 
us to the conclusion that the interests of 
justice will best be served by setting aside 
the default judgment and giving the parties 
that opportunity. In that connection, we 
call attention to th~e prefatory clausePof 
Rule 60(b) that "upon such Je rms as are. 
just"~a~party may be relieved from a judg-
m e n t . This authorizes the tria1~CQurl to 
impose such terms as may be just as a 
"C6nditibTiT6~seTting"aside the default. 
The default judgment is vacated and the 
case remanded for further proceedings. _No_ 
costs awarded. 
MAUGHAN and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
In denying defendant's motion to vacate 
judgment, the trial court was applying a 
specific statutory standard: "On motion 
and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 
party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
. ."
 l
 It is not to be questioned that 
the policy ol the law favors the granting of 
5. See Cutler v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897 
(1907); Locke v. Peterson, footnote 3 above. 
1. Rule 6(Kb)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. See Xlayhew v Standard Gilsomte Company, 
14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951 (1962). 
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with in binding o\er petitioner from cit\ 
to district court though magistrate did not 
sum the order 
Affirmed 
1. Criminal Law C=>273 1(4) 
There was no violation of petitioners 
rights when he pleaded guilt\ alter ha\mg 
been counseled In his attorney and after 
a plenarv explanation of his rights and 
possible consequences of his plea In the trial 
court 
2. Criminal Law C=>240 
Statute was sufficient^ complied with 
in binding o\er petitioner from citv to dis-
trict court though magistiatc did not si^u 
the order V C \ 19-3, 77-1^-19 
3 Criminal Law <C=>244 
Where contention that statutorv proce-
dures were not followed in transferring 
transcript from cit\ to district court was 
attended with unsatisfacton and specula-
tive testimony, there was no error in resolv-
mg i^sue against petitioner U C A 1 9 : \ 
77-15-19. 
Lewis Banks, Jr , pro se 
Vernon B Romnev, -\tt\ Gen, Da\id S 
\ oung, Asst \ t t \ Gen , Salt Lake Cit\ for 
defendant and respondent 
HEXRIOD, Justice 
\ppeal from the denial of a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus \ffirmed 
[1] Banks, with the aid of counsel, 
whose competcnev no one questioned, plead-
ed guilt} to a forger) charge after anothei 
charge was dropped, after having been 
counseled b> his attorney and after a ple-
nan explanation of his rights and the pos-
sible consequences of his plea In, the trial 
ludge 
The reeoid no \\a\ re fleets his claim 
that he did not voluntanh and intelligent!} 
enter his plea 
[2,3] His ur^ence th.it the binding o\er 
process from the eit\ to the district court 
was in Molation of Title 77-15-19, Utah 
Code \nnotated 1953, because the magis 
trate did not sign the order is resohed in 
State \ Laris, 78 Utah 183 2 P 2d 2-H 
(1931), and that Title 77-15-19, U C A 
1953 relating to transternng the transcript 
to the district eourt was not followed, was 
attended with such unsatisfactorv and spec-
u l a t e testimonv that the trial court most 
eertainl} was not in error in resohing this 
issue against the appellant 
\\ e conclude that the principles enun 
ciated in the recent case ot Brad\ \ United 
States, 397 U S 742, 90 S Ct 1463, 2'^ 
L Ed 2d 747 (1970) are dispositive of the 
claim here under the facts reflected in the 
record 
C \LLISTER C I , and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and TUCKFTT, II , concur 
29 Utah 2el 156 
Raymond STEWART, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John L. SULLIVAN and Richard Monk 
Alien, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 12958. 
Supieine Couit of Utah 
Feb 7>, 1973 
\ctions were brought b} automobile 
passenger against host d n \ e r and d rncr 
of other vehicle for personal injuries 
From a judgment of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Count}, Stewart M Han-
son, J , dismissing actions without preju-
dice, the defendants appealed The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, ]., held that where 
automobile passenger filed separate actions 
against host driver and d rne r of other 
automobjle and host served written in-
terrogatories on passenger who neglected 
to answer same after which on motion of 
e 
STEWART v. SULLIVAN 
Cite as 50« V 2d 74 
Utah 75 
other driver the two cases were consoli-
UUi\ and thcreatur complaint was dis-
"•^ TTrTd tor failure of passenger mterroga-
rT7T^ oi host although he had answered 
•
 tl ^taTnialK^" similar inter rogatories sub-
dnver, under circum-
abuse its discre-not 
MlilUM| 1,} other 
tion against Richard Monk Allen, the driv-
er of the automobile which collided with 
the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a 
passenger. 
On September 24, 1970, the defendant 
John L. Sullivan served written interroga-
tories upon the plaintiff which the plain-
tiff neglected to answer. At a later date 
Sullivan moved for an order compelling 
answers to the interrogatories, which mo-
tion was granted by the court and an order 
entered requiring answers within 15 days 
after service of the order upon the plain-
tiff. 
Upon motion of the defendant Allen, the 
two cases were ordered consolidated. On 
insing out of accident and host served CMarch 4, 19/£)the motions were made to 
written interrogatories on passenger who dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the 
ITTnces Court did 
.„>n setting aside its former order and 
dttermimng that the action should be dis-
TM - e d without prejudice 
\f firmed. 
Discovery C=>70 
Where automobile passenger filed sep-
arate actions against host driver and driver 
,,f other automobile for personal injuries 
neglected to answer same after which on 
motion oi other driver the two cases were 
consolidated and thereafter complaint was 
dismissed for failure of passenger inter-
rogatories of host although passenger had 
answered substantially similar interroga-
tories submitted b\ other driver, under cir-
cumstances, court did not abuse its discre-
tion in setting aside its former order and 
determining that the action should be dis-
missed without prejudice. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 60(bH"^ * """"" 
[ack L Schoenhals, Salt Lake City, for 
Sullivan. 
David K Winder, of Strong & Hanni, 
Milt Lake City, for Allen 
David E West, Armstrong, Rawhngs, 
West & Schaerrer, Salt Lake City, for 
Mew art. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
*Ihe plaintiff filed these proceedings in 
•he court below seeking to recover for 
pergonal injuries suffered in an automobile 
undent. At the outset plaintiff filed a 
kara te action against the defendant John 
r
 Sullivan, the driver of an automobile 
'i which the plaintiff was riding as a pas-
-uiger, claiming that Sullivan was guilty 
oi wilful misconduct, and also filed an ac-
basis of his failure to answer the interroga-
tories. The motions were granted and an 
order entered dismissing the complaint of 
the plaintiff. 
On May 14, 1971, the attorney who had 
represented the plaintiff was suspended 
from the practice of law. Plaintiff re-
tained other counsel, and on March 162 
1972, counsel for the plaintiff appeared ex 
parte and obtained an order from the court, 
which amended its prior order and recited 
that the complaint was dismissed without 
prejudice. On April 13, 1972, after a hear-
ing and all parties being represented, the 
court set aside the amended order of dis-
missal and reinstated its first order. Sub-
sequently the court granted a further hear-
ing upon the matter, after which the court 
entered a new order which recited that "the 
court having reviewed all of the files and 
records and affidavits herein" found there 
was sufficient grounds to reheve plain-
tiff from final judgment of dismissal and 
ordered that the plaintiff's complaint as 
against both defendants be dismissed with-
out prejudice It is from the latter order 
that the defendants appeal 
There are certain circumstances in con-
nection with this matter that should be 
noted. The plaintiff had answered inter-
rogatones submitted to him bv the defend-
ant Richard Monk Allen prior to the con-
7 6 Utah 506 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
lohdation of the two cases The interroga-
tories and the answers are substantialK the 
same as those submitted to the plaintiff b\ 
the defendant Sullnan. AJter the con-
solidation of the cases that information 
was available to all parties \ t the time 
the first order of dismissal was entered it 
appears that the court and counsel for the 
defendant Allen were of the impression 
that the order made was a dismissal with-
out prejudice. In a telephone comersa-
tion between counsel for the defendant Al-
len and counsel for the plaintiff, Allen's 
counsel informed counsel for the plaintiff 
that the dismissal was without prejudice 
The plaintiff had no knowledge of the dis-
missal and subsequent motions made in re-
spect thereto. It was not until se\eral 
months after his counsel became incapaci-
tated to represent him and the plaintiff had 
I J Mat hew \. standard GiKomte Co., 14 
•s Ttah 2d 52. 37l> P.2d ftol : Warren v 
Dixon Ranch Co., 123 I tali 41G. 2GO I\ 
emplo\ed othe counsel he learned what 
had transpired 
In view of the ab 'e recited circum-
stance^ and the fact that there was no dis-
position of the case on the merits, we are 
of the opinion that the court below did not 
abuse its discretion in its determination 
that the action should be dismissed without 
prejudice The proMSions of Rule 60(b) 
(7) are sufficient!) broad to permit tht 
court to set aside its former order which 
appeared to have been entered upon an 
erroneous assumption and to enter a new 
order based upon the record before if1 j 
The decision of the court below is af-
firmed. Respondent is entitled to costs. 
C\LL1STER, C J , and HEXRIOD, 
ELLETT and CROCKETT, JJ , concur 
2d 741 : Costello \. I mted States. 3T> 
1'S. 265. si SCt. .'34. ."> L.Ld2d .V>1: 
Madden \ Perr>, 7 O r . 204 F 2d 1GJ). 
Carol WORKMAN, Class 
Representative. Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., Artistic 
Homes, Inc., Imperial Excavation. Inc.. 
Gary Nagle, Lamar Nagle, Michael Na-
gle. Cindy Raleigh, Marilyn Nagle, and 
Francis Ford, Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
No. 890388-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 30, 1990. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
District Court, Salt Lake County, David S. 
Young, J., denying motion to set aside 
judgment in action brought by State under 
Consumer Sales Practices Act. The Court 
of Appeals. Dean E. Conder, Senior District 
Judge, held that: (1) prevailing party's fail-
ure to notify opponents of entry of judg-
ment did not make judgment ineffective, 
and (2) judgment entered in favor of State 
in class action brought on behalf of condo-
minium homeowners under Consumer Sales 
Practices Act was void, absent evidence 
that members of class consisting of condo-
minium owners were notified that action 
had been brought. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, J., filed opinion concurring in 
result. 
1. Judgment <s=>276 
Prevailing party's failure to notify op-
ponents of entry of judgment did not make 
judgment ineffective. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 58A(d). 
2. Judgment <S=3276 
While noncompliance with rules requir-
ing prevailing party to notify opponent of 
entry of judgment does not bring about 
automatic invalidity of entry of judgment, 
it is weighty fact when determining timeli-
ness of later challenges to judgment. Judi-
cial Administration Rule 4-504; Rules Civ. 
WORKMAN v. NAGLE CONST., INC. Utah 7 4 9 
Cllcas802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) 
Proc, Rules 58A(d), M(b)(5-7); Fed.Rules 
Civ.Proc.Rule 77(d), 28 U.S.C.A. 
3. Judgment <S=>386(1) 
Motion for relief from judgment, which 
was filed by losing party within one month 
after she learned that judgment had been 
'entered and which alleged that judgment 
was void, was timely under rule providing 
for relief from judgment, although it was 
not filed _wi thin three month's of iudgmentJs. 
entry. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b), (b)(l-7). 
4. Judgment <S=>17(1) 
Judgment entered in favor of State in 
class action brought on behalf of condomin-
ium homeowners under Consumer Sales 
Practices Act was void, absent evidence 
that members of class consisting of condo-
minium owners were notified that action 
had been brought. U.C.A.1953, 13-11-
17(l)(c). (2), 13-11-20(1), (l)(a-e); U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amends. f>, 14; Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
23(a, b). 
5. Constitutional Law <S=>309(1.5) 
Parties <3=>35.43, 35.51 
Notice to absent members of plaintiff 
class, and opportunity for them to disasso-
ciate themselves from class, are critical 
requirements for maintenance of class ac-
tion, requirements founded in federally 
guaranteed right of absent class members 
to due process of law. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14. 
6. Judgment <3=>844 
Judgment entered on behalf of State in 
class action brought on behalf of condomin-
ium owners, which was rendered void when 
members of class were not notified that 
action was pending, could not be vitalized 
by assigning judgment to class representa-
tive. U.C.A.1953, 13-ll-17(l)(c), (2), 13-
11-20(1), (l)(c); U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 
14. 
7. Judgment <s=>34t) 
Generally, district court has some dis-
cretion in ruling on motion to set aside 
judgment; however, if judgment is deter-
mined to be void, court has no discretion, 
and judgment must be set aside. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
-F 
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Bryan W. Cannon (Argued), Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and appellants. 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes (Argued), Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 
Before BENCH, GARFF and 
CONDER,1 JJ. 
OPINION 
CONDER, Judge: 
Defendant Marilyn Nagle appeals the 
district court's denial of her motion to set 
aside a judgment. We reverse. 
The Utah Division of Consumer Protec-
tion (Division) initiated this action as plain-
tiff under the Utah Consumer Sales Prac-
tices Act, title 13, chapter 11 of the Utah 
Code, alleging misconduct by the defen-
dants in the sale of certain condominiums. 
This action alleges only civil, not criminal 
claims, and the Division acted on behalf of 
what it alleged was a class consisting of 
the buyers of the condominiums in ques-
tion. The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the Division, which 
later assigned the judgment to Carol Work-
man as representative of the alleged class. 
Although the condominium buyers are said 
to be a class in the complaint and in the 
judgment, formal notice has not been given 
to the members of a class. 
After the pleadings, some early motions, 
and discovery, the district court scheduled 
a pretrial conference, which was held on 
June 17, 1986. The defendants failed to 
appear at that conference, and the court 
consequently held them liable according to 
the complaint and scheduled an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the amount of the 
damages. The defendants did not appear 
at the evidentiary hearing, and judgment 
was entered against them. . The findings 
and conclusions of this 198G judgment refer 
to this case as a class action. However, 
the 1986 judgment was later set aside 
1. Dean E. Condor, Senior District Judge, sitting 
by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990). 
2. A judgment that has not been validly entered 
is not effective as a judgment, see W'isden v. Citv 
of Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985); Yusky v. 
when the court determined that the defen-
dants' newly substituted counsel had not 
been properly notified of the pretrial con-
ference or of the ensuing evidentiary hear-
ing. 
In November of 1987, the Division moved 
for summary judgment, seeking essentially 
the same disposition as it had earlier ob-
tained after the defendants failed to appear 
at the pretrial conference. The defendants 
failed to respond to the motion for summa-
ry judgment, and the court granted it. The 
State assigned the resulting summary 
judgment to Carol Workman "as class rep-
resentative," and she was substituted as 
the sole plaintiff in this action. 
After proceedings were begun to enforce 
the judgment, Marilyn Nagle, with new 
counsel, moved in February 1989 to set the 
judgment aside pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 
60(b). The district court denied her motion. 
and she has appealed that denial. 
Notice of En t ry of Ju dgm e n t 
[1] Before determining whether the 
judgment should be set aside, we consider 
whether it was validly entered in the first 
place.2 Marilyn Nagle argues that the 
judgment was not validly entered because 
the prevailing party did not notify her of it 
pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(d), which 
reads: 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judg-
ment The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or 
entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such 
notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of ap-
peal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
In addition, former Rule 4.5 of the Rules of 
Practice of the District and Circuit Courts. 
Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 65 Utah 269, 236 
P. 452 (1925), and, since it intrinsically lacks 
force, there is no point in setting it aside. How 
ever, a seemingly effective, but nevertheless in 
valid judgment is potentially misleading and 
should be stricken. 
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in effect when this judgment was entered,3 
contained a similarly worded requirement 
that the prevailing party notify ail other 
parties that the judgment had been en-
tered. 
Workman, the current plaintiff in this 
case, concedes that neither she nor the 
Division complied with Rule 58A(d) or Rule 
4.5. However, that noncompliance does not 
invalidate the judgment. Utah R.Civ.P. 
58A(c) provides that "[a] judgment is com-
plete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on 
real property, when the same is signed and 
filed as hereinabove provided." Thus, in 
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Sohm, 755 
P.2d 155, 157 (Utah 1988), the failure to 
give notice of the judgment did not pre-
clude the effectiveness of the judgment, 
but rather, under the circumstances, was 
harmless error. Notice to the parties of 
the entry of the judgment was therefore 
not a prerequisite to its effectiveness.4 
This conclusion is consistent with the 
case law under the comparable federal 
rule. Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that the clerk of 
the court notify the parties of the entry of 
a judgment. Although in federal proce-
dure it is thus the clerk, rather than the 
prevailing party, who bears the responsibil-
ity to give notice of the judgment, the 
purpose and intended effect of the Utah 
and the federal rules are the same, namely, 
notice that a judgment has been entered. 
Federal courts generally hold that the los-
ing party's lack of the required notice does 
not preclude effectiveness of the judgment. 
See, e.g.. Tucker v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 800 F.2d 1054 (11th Cir. 
3. The judgment in this case was rendered in 
January of 1988. On October 30, 1988, Rule 4.5 
was superseded by Rule 4-504 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
4. Utah cases decided under the now repealed 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
and Circuit Courts held that the time for filing 
notice of appeal did not begin to run until 
notice of the judgment had been given. Calfo v. 
D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P.2d 697. (Utah 1986); 
Wayne Garjf Constr. Co. r. Richards, 706 P.2d 
1(^5 (Utah 1985); Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P 2d 
116, 117 (1983); Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 
50. 52 (Utah 1980). The newly revised Utah 
R.Ci\.P. 58A(d) in effect overrules these cases, 
1986); Spika r. Village of Lombard. 763 
F.2d 282 (7th Cir.1985), cert denied 474 
U.S. 1056, 106 S.Ct. 793, 88 L.Ed.2d 771 
(1986); Orshan r. Macchiarola, 105 F.R.D. 
534 (D.N.Y.19S5). 
[2] However, the failure to give the re-
quired notice is an important factor in de-
termining the timeliness of post-judgment 
proceedings, where an exact time limit is 
not prescribed. If a party has had notice 
of the judgment but has nevertheless re-
mained idle in attacking it in the court of 
rendition or in appealing it, that lack of 
diligence is a strong reason not to disturb 
the judgment. On the other hand, if a 
losing party has remained ignorant of a 
judgment in part because the prevailing 
party has not complied with Rule 58A(d), 
the resulting delay is more reasonable for 
purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7). Rule 58A(d) 
and the current Rule 4-504 are therefore 
not inert desiderata. Rather, while non-
compliance with those rules does not bring 
about the automatic invalidity of an en-
tered judgment, it is a weighty factor in 
determining the timeliness of later chal-
lenges to the judgment under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7). A judgment 
is thus presumed effective when entered 
until a timely and meritorious challenge is 
brought against it, and Rules 58A(d) and 
4-504 weigh heavily in determining wheth-
er a challenge under Rule 60(b)(5H7) is 
timely. 
We therefore hold that the judgment in 
this case has taken effect, despite the plain-
tiffs failure to send the required notice of 
the judgment. We proceed to consider the 
timeliness of the motion to set the judg-
and provides that the time for filing notice of 
appeal begins to run when the judgment is en-
tered, and entry does not include a requirement 
that counsel give notice of the judgment. See 
Graco Fishing <£ Rental Tools. Inc. v. Iron wood 
Exploration, Inc., 735 P.2d b2 (Utah 1987) (re-
manding to consider extension of time for ap-
peal despite failure to ser\e notice of judgment). 
With regard to post-trial motions in the trial 
court, rather than to notices of appeal, the rule 
has long been that the time for filing begins to 
run even though notice of the judgment was not 
given. In re Bundy's Estate, 121 Utah 299, 241 
P.2d 462 (1952). 
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merit aside, bearing in mind the fact that 
Marilyn Nagle did not receive the required 
notice of the judgment. 
Timeliness under Rule 60(b) 
[3] Before considering the merits of the 
motion to set aside, we consider the time 
requirements for such a motion prescribed 
by Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) enumer-
ates seven grounds for setting aside judg-
ments, and requires that a motion relying 
on grounds (1) through (4) be made within 
three months of the entry of the judgment 
None of grounds (1) through (4) has been 
asserted in this case, perhaps in view of the 
fact that Marilyn Nagle's motion to set the 
judgment aside was made over a vear after 
tKJM u dgi^rir~was_£atered. 
A rule J30(b) motion relyJng_ox), grounds 
[oM^rough (7) need_noL.^necessarily . be 
made within three months, but it must be 
made "within a reasonable time": 
[A] party seeking relief under [Fed.R. 
Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7)] must do so 
within a "reasonable time." The bases 
for relief are that the judgment is void, 
or that ifTias beelT^atisfied. or that the 
law on which the court rehed has been 
reversed, or, if an injunctive decree is 
involved, that a change in circumstances 
makes it no longer equitable to enforce 
it. The derision not to limit the right to 
raise these challenges within a set time 
period reflects th<^seriousnesfr of the is-
sues. . . . In generalTTITltfeF'all of these 
\ provisions the moving party need show 
|,only that she acted diligently once tjie^ 
I ]basis for relief became available, (and 
that the delay in seeking relief did not 
cause undue hardship to the opposing 
party. 
J. Friedenthal, M. Kane &. A. Miller, Civil 
Procedure § 12.6 at 574 (1985); sec also 11 
5. The State was the onl\ named plaintiff in this 
case until after the judgment was awaidcd, even 
though the State was not a member of the 
"plaintiff class. The State was therefore an 
inappropriate choice as class representative, 
since it had no claims of its own that were 
tvpical of the class. Sec Utah Code Ann 
§ 13-11-20(1 )(c) (19S6) While the State mav, 
in its own name, press the claims of those who 
complain to it under section 13-11-17( 1 )U), sec 
Slate ex rel Div. of Consumer Protection r. CiAh 
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Pructici d-
Procedure § 2866 (1973). 
In this case, Marilyn Nagle moved to M-t 
aside the judgment within about a month 
alter learning that the judgment had been 
entered, and her ignorance of the judgment 
until that time was due in part to a lack of 
notice that the plaintiff was required u» 
provide, furthermore, her "motion asserts-. 
with good reason as noted below, that tin-
judgment is void, and the seriousness of 
that basis for setting aside the judgment 
also weighs heavily in favor of holding her 
timing to be reasonable. Marilyn Nagle"^ 
motion was therefore timely under rule 
60(b). and, since no other procedural irregu-
larities appear on the threshold, we proceed 
to the merits of her motion and consider 
whether the district coui i eired in refusing 
to set the judgment aside. 
Procedural Defects in Class Action 
[4] This case was apparently intended 
to be a class action. The Division is en-
abled by Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-17 (19Mi) 
to bring essentially two types of actions for 
the recovery of damages compensating con-
sumers, an action under section 13-11-
17(1 )(c) "to recover . . . on behalf of con-
sumers who complained to the [Division] 
within a reasonable time after it instituted 
proceedings under this chapter," or a class 
action under section 13-11-17(2) on behalf 
of consumers. There is no mention in this 
case that any of the allegedly aggrieved 
consumers complained to the Division with-
in a reasonable time; rather, the complaint 
contains allegations supporting the forma-
tion of a class, and the judgment that Mari-
lyn Nagle seeks to set aside is based on the 
express conclusion that a class properly 
exists and is to receive the judgment ' 
However, although this case was pursued 
Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Uah 1988). section 13-11-
20(1) requiies that a class action be brought in 
the name of a representative member or mem 
bers of the class. The enoneous designation of 
the State as class representative is another de 
feet in this class action, besides lack ot notice t<» 
the class. However, we do not re.st oui decision 
on the choice of class repiescntativc, but iathu 
rneieK note the problem for the distuct u»titis 
consideration on remand. 
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as a class action, there is no indication in 
the record that the members of the class 
were notified that this would-be class ac-
tion was pending, that they had a right to 
pursue their claims independently of the 
class, and that a judgment rendered in the 
class action would conclusively adjudicate 
their claims against the defendants. 
[5] Notice to absent members of a 
plaintiff class, and an opportunity for them 
to disassociate themselves from the class, 
are critical requirements for maintenance 
of a class action, requirements founded in 
the federally guaranteed right of the ab-
sent class members to due process of law. 
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 
U.S. 797, 811-12, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2974-75, 
W L.Ed.2d 628 (1985); In re Temple, 851 
F.2d 1269 (11th Cir.1988); Wehner v. Syn-
tax Corp., 117 F.R.D. 641, 645 (N.D.Cal. 
1987). A class action adjudicates the rights 
of persons who ordinarily are not actively 
involved in the litigation or aware of specif-
ic actions taken in it. Because of this fact, 
the court assumes some responsibility to 
protect the interests of the absent class 
members. Phillips, 472 U.S. at 809, 105 
S.Ct. at 2973; 3B J. Moore & J. Kennedy, 
Moore's Federal Practice fl 23.45[4.-5] 
(1987) (characterizing a class action as a 
"quasi-administrative proceeding conducted 
by the judge"); Kaplan, Continuing Work 
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 
b\ Harv.L.Rev. 356. 398 (1967). The result-
ing adjudication of the rights of persons 
without their active participation, and the 
added burden on the court, are justified 
only if the prerequisites for a class action 
are met. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 13-11-20(1 KaHe); Utah R.Civ.P. 23(a)-
ib).6 
6. A class action is not the only.means of orga-
nizing, for litigation purposes, a group of claim-
ants whose interests appear to be aligned or 
similar. Such a group mav form an association, 
a non-profit corporation, or use another means 
of organizing private activity. Such private o? 
ganizational forms have the advantage of leav-
ing in the claimants' hands the decisions con-
f i n i n g their relations between themselves, 
rather than placing the court in the role of 
defining and overseeing those relations in su-
pervising a class. 
LE CONST.. INC. Utah 7 5 3 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
In this case, nothing in the record indi-
cates that the members of the would-be 
class consisting of the condominium own-
ers were notified that this action had been 
brought to adjudicate their claims against 
the defendants. Workman's counsel repre-
sented at oral argument that the condomin-
ium owners had actual knowledge of the 
litigation in this case and notice to them 
would therefore have arguably been a 
mere formality. However, there is no evi-
dence in the record to support this repre-
sentation of counsel. While we have no 
particular reason to doubt it, there is never-
theless no sufficient evidentiary basis to 
support a finding that the condominium 
owners had actual knowledge of this ac-
tion, as counsel represented." Wre there-
fore lack the factual predicate for taking 
up the issue whether actual knowledge sat-
isfies the right of the class members to 
notice. Based on the record before us, 
there is no evidence that the condominium 
owners knew or were notified of this litiga-
tion and its potential effect on their rights 
in relation to the defendants. 
The requirement that the class in this 
case be notified of the class action is found-
ed on the due process rights of the mem-
bers of the class, who are not active in this 
litigation. A judgment is void as against 
persons to whom due process has not been 
accorded in its rendition.s The judgment in 
favor of the state on behalf of this would-
be class of condominium owners is there-
fore void. 
[6] Since the void judgment was a nulli-
ty when rendered, Workman took nothing 
when it was assigned to her. Moreover, 
even if we assume that corrective action 
after rendition could somehow breathe life 
into the void judgment, the assignment to 
7. See Redd v. Segley, 785 P.2d 1098 (LTtah 1989). 
8. Bradford v. Xagie, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah 1988) 
(judgment not satisfving the minimum contacts 
test o\ the due process clause was void); In re 
Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448-50 
(9th Cir.1985); Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward 
Co., 520 P.2d 1352. 1356-58 (Alaska 1974). 
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Workman would create no basis for cor-
recting and salvaging the judgment, be-
cause the assignment provides that Work-
man acts as a representative of the class. 
It is clearly a step in the right direction for 
a class representative (rather than the 
State, which is not a member of the class) 
to pursue this class action, but the assign-
ment does not correct the lack of notice to 
the members of the class. Thus, the ameli-
orative action taken after entry does not 
vitalize this void judgment. 
We respectfully decline to take the ap-
proach suggested in the concurring opin-
ion, primarily because it was not considered 
by the trial court or the parties, leaving us 
without some necessary information. An 
appellate court can indeed raise a jurisdic-
tional point sua sponte,9 but not all proce-
dural nonconformities create jurisdictional 
defects. Moreover, even if we were to 
assume that administrative noncompliance 
with section 13-ll-17(2)(a) could affect the 
court's jurisdiction, we lack the basis for 
determining whether the Division failed to 
comply with section 13-1 l-17(2)(a) in this 
case. Such a determination would hinge in 
part on whether the defendants committed 
an act or practice which violated an admin-
istrative or case law rule, and we cannot 
simply assume, in the absence of argument 
and a trial court decision on the issue, that 
the defendants did not violate such a rule. 
Moreover, the Division is empowered to sue 
in its own name, see Utah Code Ann. 
9. Western Capital & Sees., Inc. \. Knudsvig, 768 
P.2d 989, 992 (Utah Ct.App.). cert, denied, 779 
P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Palmer, 
111 P.2d 521 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (appellate juris-
diction). 
10. Quinn v. Quinn, 772 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989); Demetuas v. Tallas, 764 P.2d 628 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1988). 
11. Generally, the district court has some discre-
tion in ruling on a rule 60(b; motion. However, 
if the judgment is determined to be void, the 
court has no discretion, and the judgment must 
be set aside. Honneiis v. Donovan, 691 P .2d 1. 2 
(1st Cir.1982); Jordan v. Gillian. 500 r\2d 701 
(6th Cir.1974), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Cl. 
19Q6, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1974); 11 C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 at 
197 (1973). 
12. Nothing in our ruling requires the dismissal 
of the claims raised in this case. Rather, on 
§ 13-11-17UXC) (1986), as well as on behalf 
of a class, and the complaint can be inter-
preted under notice-pleading rules l<> as 
stating a claim for relief to the Division on 
behalf of complaining consumers who were 
later erroneously certified into a class, not-
withstanding the lack of notice to them 
[7] In conclusion, Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(5) requires n that a void 
judgment be set aside. Marilyn Nagle 
moved to do so, and. for the reasons noted 
above, the district court erred in denying 
her motion. The denial of her motion is 
therefore reversed, the judgment is set 
aside as void, and this case is remanded for 
further proceedings.11' 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in result): 
I agree that the class judgment awarded 
to the Division of Consumer Protection (Di-
vision), and later assigned to Workman, is 
void, but on different grounds. While the 
majority rests its decision upon a procedur-
al defect, with which I do not necessarily 
disagree, I believe that under the Utah 
Consumer Sales Practices Act (the Act), no 
class action may be maintained in the 
present case. Any class judgment would 
therefore be void, even if procedurally cor-
rect under section 13-11-20 of the Act. 
It is clear from the pleadings that the 
only cause of action alleged against defen-
remand, the judgment should be treated as if il 
had never been entered, because it is void. 
From this point, the district court could, on 
motion of a party or sua sponte, proceed to 
certify a class pursuant to section 13-11-20. if it 
first determines that the Division had authority" 
to sue on behalf of a class in this case. Alterna-
tively, the action could be pursued, not by a 
class, but by the individual parties in their own 
names, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (1986). 
Once the condominium owners have properly 
become parties (assuming no further involve 
ment by the State), the court and the parties 
may proceed to consider the merits. 
The decision from which this appeal was tak 
en was the denial of a motion by all remaining 
defendants to set the judgment aside; however, 
only Marilyn Nagle appealed. Our ruling on 
appeal therefore applies only to Marilyn Nagle. 
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Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- "attorney fees" for "attorneys' fees" throughout 
ment added Subdivision <9> and substituted the rule. 
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Appl icabi l i ty : 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of 
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Withdrawal requiring court approval. Consistent with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record only 
upon approval of the court when a motion has been filed and the court has not 
issued an order on the motion or after a certificate of readiness for trial has 
been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney may not withdraw except 
upon motion and order of the court. 
(2) Withdrawal not requiring court approval. If an attorney withdraws 
under circumstances where court approval is not required, the notice of 
withdrawal shall include a statement by the attorney that no motion has been 
filed on which the court has not issued an order and that no certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed. 
(3) If an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, the withdrawing attorney 
must serve written notice of the withdrawal upon the client of the withdrawing 
attorney and upon all other parties not in default. A certificate of service must 
be filed with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal 
shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(4) If an attorney withdraws, dies, is suspended from the practice of law, is 
disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, opposing counsel shall 
serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented client. The 
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must inform the unrepresented client of 
the responsibility to appear in a court or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice 
to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further 
proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days have elapsed from filing of 
the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the client of the withdrawing 
attorney waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the 
court. 
(5) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the current counsel of 
record by filing and serving a notice of substitution of counsel. Filing a 
substitution of counsel enters the appearance of new counsel of record and 
effectuates the withdrawal of the attorney being replaced. Where a request lor 
a delay of proceedings is not made, substitution of counsel does not require the 
approval of the court. Where new counsel requests a delay of proceedings, 
substitution of counsel requires the approval of the court as provided in this 
rule. 
(Amended effective January 15,1990; April 15, 1991; Mav 15, 1994; November 
1, 1997.) 
Amendment Notes . — The 1997 amend-
ment rewrote this rule. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Notice to appoint counsel. of its responsibility to appoint counsel unt 
Cited. Subdivision (3> before filing its motion to dis-
miss rendered it improper for the trial cour 
Notice to appoint counsel dismiss plaintiff's action, notwithstanding l* 
Defendant's failure to give notice to plaintiff inordinate period oi inactivity that prece 
3 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp v Larson 20 Utah 
2d 369 438 P 2d 540(1968) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22AAm Jur 2d Declarator A.L.R. — Right to jur> trial in action for 
Judgments ^ 183 186 203 et *eq declaratory relief in state court 33 A L R 4th 
C.J.S. — 26 C J S Declarator. Judgments 146 
*§ 17 18 104 155 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the leidict of a jury Unless the court otherwise directs 
and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a jur> 
shall be forthwith signed b> the clerk and filed If there is a special verdict or 
a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jurv 
pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment which 
shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed 
(b) Judgment in other cases Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk 
(c) When judgment entered, notation in register of actions and judgment 
docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, 
except the creation of a hen on real property, when the same is signed and filed 
as herein above provided The clerk shall immediatel> make a notation of the 
judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment A copy of the signed judgment 
shall be promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in 
Rule 5 The time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement 
of this provision 
(e) Judgment after death of a party If a party dies after a verdict or decision 
upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon 
(f) Judgment by confession Whenever a judgment by confession is autho-
rized b> statute, the part\ seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it shall 
concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is justly due or 
to become due, 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the plaintiff 
against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim and that the 
sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same, 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any 
(Amended effective September 4, 1985, January 1, 1987, November 1, 1997 ) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of 
ment in Subdivision <d> rewrote the first sen- this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a) 
tence which hid read "The prevailing partv F R C P 
shall prompt K give notice of the signing or Cross References. — Judgment against 
en tn of judgment to all other parties and shall person d\ ing after \ erdict or decision not a hen 
file proof of ser\ ice of such notice w ith the clerk on realt\ ^ 78 22 11 
of the court " and in the second sentence deleted
 J u d g r n e n t bv confession authorized * 78 22 
"However from the beginning and deleted "no g 
tice before requirement 
h 
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7 (utah 1993), Putvin V. Thompson, 878 P2d App 1997), PDQ Lube Ctr, Inc v Huber, 329 
it 78 (Utah Ct App 1994), Ron Shepherd Ins v Utah Adv Rep 20 (Utah Ct App 1997), PDQ 
Qh elds 882 P2d 650 (Utah 1994), Commercial Lube Ctr, Inc v Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct 
Inv Corp v Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct App 1997) 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new tnal 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extnnsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
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was entered or taken A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998 ) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as ground* for a motion 
the following '(4) when for am cause the 
summons in an action has not been personalh 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action " This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con 
"Am other reason justifying relief 
— Default judgment 
— Impossibility of compliance with order 
— Incompetent counsel 
— Lack of due process 
—Merits of case 
— Mistake or inadvertence 
— Mutual mistake 
—Real party in interest 
— Refund of fine after dismissal 
Appeals 
Clerical mistakes 
— Computation of damages 
— Correction after appeal 
—Date of judgment 
Void judgment 
—Estate record 
— Inherent power of courts 
—Intent of court and parties 
—Judicial error distinguished 
—Order prepared by counsel 
—Predating of new trial motion 
Court's discretion 
Default judgment 
EfFect of set aside judgment 
—Admissions 
Form of motion 
Fraud 
— Burden of proof 
— Divorce action 
Independent action 
—Constitutionality of taxes 
— Divorce decree 
— Fraud or duress 
— Motion distinguished 
Invalid summons 
—Amendment without notice 
Inequity of prospective application 
Jurisdiction 
Mistake inadvertence surprise or excusable 
neglect 
— Default judgment 
Illness 
Inconvenience 
Meritorious 
Merits of claim 
Negligence of attorney 
flict with rules permitting sen ice by means 
other than personal service 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60 F R C P 
No claim for relief 
— Delayed motion for new trial 
—Factual error 
—Failure to file cost bill 
—Failure to file notice of appeal 
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings 
—Trial courts discretion 
— Unemplo\ment compensation appeal 
—Workmen s compensation appeal 
New lv discovered e\ idence 
— Burden of proof 
— Discretion not abused 
Procedure 
— Notice to parties 
Res judicata 
Reversal of judgment 
— Invalidation of sale 
Satisfaction, release or discharge 
—Accord and satisfaction 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand 
—Erroneously included damages 
—Prospective application of judgment 
Timeliness of motion 
— Confused mental condition of party 
— Dismissal for lack of prosecution 
—Fraud 
—Invalid service 
—Judicial error 
—Jurisdiction 
— Mistake inadvertence and neglect 
— Newly discovered evidence 
— Order entered upon erroneous assumption 
— "Reasonable time 
— Reconsideration of previouslv denied motion 
— Satisfaction 
Unauthorized appearance 
Void judgment 
— Basis 
— Lack of jurisdiction 
Cited 
"Any other reason justifying relief.* 
Subdivision lbX7) embodies three require 
ments First that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6) 
second that thet^ason justify relief and third 
that the motiondha made within a reasonable 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new tnal 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
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ments First that the reason be one other than 
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78-51-35 JUDICIAL CODE 566 
(2) upon the order of the court or judge thereof upon the 
application of the client, after notice to the attorney. 
1953 
78-51-35. Effect — Not ice of change . 
When an attorney is changed as provided in Section 78-51-
34, written notice of the change and of the substitution of a 
new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person must 
be given to the adverse party; until then he must recognize the 
former attorney. 1995 
78-51-36. Not ice to appoint successor. 
When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended, or ceases 
to act as such, a party to an action or proceeding for whom he 
was acting as attorney must, before any further proceedings 
are had against him be required by the adverse party, by 
written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in 
person. 1953 
78-51-37. Convict ion of cr ime — J u d g m e n t of disbar-
ment — Duty of c lerks of court. 
Upon conviction of an attorney and counselor of felony, or 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the judgment of the 
Supreme Court must be that the name of the accused be 
stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors of the court, 
and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney or 
counselor in all the courts of this state; upon conviction in 
other cases, the judgment of the court may be, according to the 
gravity of the offense charged, deprivation of the right to 
practice as an attorney or counselor in the courts of this state 
permanently or for a limited period. The clerk of the court in 
which any such conviction is had must within thirty days 
thereafter transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of 
the record of conviction, which shall be conclusive evidence 
thereof. 1953 
78-51-38. Suretyship —Attorney forbidden to assume. 
No practicing attorney and counselor shall become a surety 
in any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which he is 
engaged as attorney. 1953 
78-51-39. Certain officials not to pract ice law. 
Sheriffs, clerks of courts and constables, and their deputies, 
are prohibited from practicing law or acting as attorneys and 
counselors, or from having as a partner an attorney and 
counselor or anyone who acts as such. 1953 
78-51-40. Corporat ions and assoc iat ions forbidden to 
pract ice — Except ions . 
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary asso-
ciation, except such as are organized for benevolent or chari-
table purposes, or organizations approved by the Supreme 
Court and formed for the purpose of assisting persons without 
means in the pursuit of civil remedies, to hold itself out to the 
public by advertisement or otherwise as being entitled to 
practice law or to furnish attorneys or counselors, or to render 
legal services or advice of any kind in any action or proceeding, 
or to solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for the 
purpose of bringing action thereon. Any corporation or volun-
tary association violating any of the provisions of this section 
is liable to a fine of not more than $5,000; and every officer, 
agent or employee of such corporation or voluntary association 
who directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corpora-
tion or voluntary association in any of the acts herein prohib-
ited, or assists such corporation or voluntary association to do 
such prohibited acts, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact that 
such officer, agent or employee is a duly and regularly licensed 
attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow any such 
corporation or voluntary association to do the acts prohibited 
herein, nor shall such fact be a defense upon the trial of any of 
the persons mentioned herein for a violation of the provisions 
of this section. 1953 
78-51-41. Compensat ion — Lien. 
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for services 
is governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not 
restrained by law. From the commencement of an action, or 
the service of an answer containing a counterclaim or at the 
time that the attorney and client enter into a written or oral 
employment agreement, the attorney who is so employed has 
a lien upon the client's cause of action or counterclaim, which 
attaches to any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judg-
ment in the client's favor and to the proceeds thereof in 
whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected by 
any settlement between the parties before or after judgment. 
Any written employment agreement shall contain a statement 
that the attorney has a lien upon the client's cause of action or 
counterclaim. 1989 
78-51-42. Refus ing to pay over money — Penalty. 
An attorney and counselor who receives money or property 
of his client in the course of his professional business and who 
refuses to pay or deliver the same to the person entitled 
thereto within a reasonable time after demand is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 1953 
78-51-43. Except ion — D e m a n d for bond. 
When an attorney and counselor claims to be entitled to a 
lien upon money or property of his client in his possession he 
is not liable to the penalty of Section 78-51-42, unless he 
neglects or refuses to pay or deliver such money or property to 
the person entitled thereto upon such person giving a bond 
with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the 
district court, conditioned for the payment of the amount of 
such attorney's claim when legally established. 19M 
78-51-44. Except ion on g iv ing bond. 
Nor shall the attorney and counselor be liable as aforesaid, 
if he shall give a sufficient bond, to be approved by the clerk of 
the district court, conditioned that he will pay or deliver the 
whole or any portion of such money or property to the claimant 
in the event such claimant shall finally establish his right 
thereto. 1959 
CHAPTERS 52 TO 55 
RESERVED 
PART VII 
COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS 
CHAPTER 56 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE UNTIL 
JANUARY 1, 1998] 
Section 
78-56-1. Repealed. 
78-56-1.1. Record of district court proceedings [Effectj 
until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-2. Duties of shorthand reporter [Repealed efij 
tive January 1, 1998J. ,<f| 
78-56-3. Compensation — Traveling expenses —ijjj 
quency of payment [Effective until Janu] 
1, 1998J. 
78-56-4. Compensation — Transcripts and copie^J 
fective until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-5. Assistant reporters — Duties — Compensajjj 
[Repealed effective January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-6. Certified transcripts prima facie correct [Effl 
tive until January 1, 1998]. 
78-56-7. Oath — Bond — Action on bond [Repeal 
effective January 1, 1998]. 
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Art. IV, § 4 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 576 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VIII 
[Religious and polit ical f r eedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT II I 
[ Q u a r t e r i n g so ld ie rs . ] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s a n d se i zu res . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[ C r i m i n a l a c t i o n s — P r o v i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g — D u e p r o -
ce s s of l aw a n d j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n c lauses . ] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without jus t compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[R igh t s of a c c u s e d . ] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial b y j u r y i n civil cases . ] 
In Suits a t common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT DC 
[Righ t s r e t a i n e d b y people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall, 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[ P o w e r s r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s o r people . ] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Su i t s a g a i n s t s t a t e s — R e s t r i c t i o n of j u d i c i a l power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be con 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Elec t ion of P r e s i d e n t a n d Vice -Pres iden t . ] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per-
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of, 
the Government of the United States, directed to the Presi-
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi-
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
i 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. XVIII, 8 1 
AMENDMENT XIII 
ration 
lL(t (Slavery prohibited.) 
RL (Power to enforce amendment.) 
[flection 1. [8lavery prohibited.) 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
Enishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly ivicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place bject to their jurisdiction. 
See. 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation. 
u 
n
 AMENDMENT XIV 
*• 
Section 
1. (Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.) 
2. (Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.] 
3. (Disqualification to hold office.] 
4. (Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confed-
eracy and claims not to be paid.) 
5. (Power to enforce amendment.) 
Section 1. (Cit izenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.) 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
lubject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
nake or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
mmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representat ives — P o w e r to reduce appoint-
ment.) 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice 
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judi-
cial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3 . [Disqualif ication to hold office.) 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, 
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, 
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be ques t ioned — Debts of 
the Confederacy and c la ims not to be paid.) 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, autho-
rized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions 
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel-
lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
Sec . 5. [Power to enforce amendment . ) 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. I Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.) 
2. |Power to enforce amendment.) 
Sec t ion 1. (Right of c i t izens to vote >— Race or color 
not to disqualify.) 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
Sec . 2. [Power to enforce amendment . ) 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.) 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on 
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportion-
ment among the several States, and without regard to any 
census or enumeration. 
AMENDMENT XVII 
[Elect ion of senators.) 
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six 
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in 
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors 
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the 
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to a fleet the 
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid 
as part of the Constitution. 
AMENDMENT XVIII 
(REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT 
XXI, SECTION l . | 
Section 
1. (National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.) 
2. (Concurrent power to enforce amendment.) 
3. (Time limit for adoption.) 
Sect ion 1. [National prohibit ion — Intoxicat ing li-
quors.) 
After one year from the ratification of this article the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors 
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
\fY\ 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
PREAMBLE 
Article 
I. Declaration of Rights 
II. State Boundaries 
III. Ordinance 
IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage 
V. Distribution of Powers 
VI. Legislative Department 
VII. Executive Department 
VIII. Judicial Department 
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment 
X. Education 
XI. Counties, Cities and Towns 
XII. Corporations 
XIII. Revenue and Taxation 
XIV. Public Debt 
XV. Militia 
XVI. Labor 
XVII. Water Rights 
XVIII. Forestry 
XIX. Public Buildings and State Institutions 
XX. Public Lands 
XXI. Salaries 
XXII. Miscellaneous 
XXIII. Amendment and Revision 
XXIV. Schedule 
PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people 
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of 
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITU-
TION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.1 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to vote or 
hold office.] 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.] 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of war-
rant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. [Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Rights retained by people.] 
Section 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. [Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
Sect ion 1. [Inherent and inal ienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and 
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates of their con-
sciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec . 2. [All polit ical power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free 
governments are founded on their authority for their equal 
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare may require. 
1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal 
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the 
supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Rel igious l iberty — N o property qualification 
to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be 
required as a qualification for any office of public t rust or for 
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent 
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, 
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated 
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment. No 
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the 
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature 
from defining the lawful use of arms. 1984 (2nd s.s.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable 
except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is 
substantial evidence to support the charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or 
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous 
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the new felony charge; or 
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated 
by s tatute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is 
581 
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